Paper tiger, hidden dragons 2: APRIL fools

 

Review of the main points of the Profits on Paper report according to the APRIL Fools report

Chris Barr:
The Indonesian Pulp and Paper Industry
The CIFOR-WWF report 2001

In 2001, the Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) in Indonesia, together with WWF's Macroeconomics Program Office, released a landmark study entitled "Profits on Paper - the Political Economy of Fiber, Finance and Debt in Indonesia's Pulp and Paper Industries: Banking on Sustainability: Structural Adjustment and Forestry Reform in Post-Suharto Indonesia". This report provides compelling evidence that the Indonesian pulp and paper industry is causing serious damage to Indonesian forests and is likely to be responsible for a high level of illegal logging.

The study partly points the finger of blame at poor governmental regulation. Significantly, it also finds that financial institutions have played a key role in fuelling the unsustainable expansion of Indonesia's pulp and paper industry. They provide finance for massive pulp and paper processing facilities even though the industry had failed to secure a legal and sustainable source for all its raw material needs.

 

More at CIFOR web site:

As a result the Indonesian pulp and paper industry is running out of wood and facing a plantation-based raw material short-fall for at least the next six years and possibly far longer.6 Not only have the industry's major producers been responsible for sourcing most of its timber by destroying natural forests, they will continue such damaging practice for many years to come. Financial institutions have failed to apply due diligence in assessing this raw material crisis and in doing so taken on an extraordinary amount of financial risk.

The key finding of the CIFOR-WWF report are as follows :

1. Rapid Growth
Indonesian pulp production capacity grew from 606,000 to 4.9 million metric tonnes per annum between 1988 to 2000 while the paper industry's processing capacity rose from 1.2 million to 8.3 million tonnes per annum. By 2000, pulp and paper products generated US$2.9 billion in export earnings, accounting for over 50 per cent of the country's forest-related exports. As a result, Indonesia suddenly moved into the ranks of the world's top 10 producers.

Four large conglomerates have dominated Indonesia's pulp industry. The two most significant players are the Sinar Mas Group and the Raja Garuda Mas Group, each of which is an integrated producer, operating large-scale pulp processing operations that are directly related to affiliated paper production facilities. The Sinar Mas Group has co-ordinated its pulp and paper operations through a Singapore-incorporated holding company, Asia Pulp & Paper (APP). Raja Garuda Mas Group has used another Singapore-based holding company to co-ordinate its activities - Asia Pacific Resources International Ltd (APRIL).

APRIL controls one pulp processing facility, Riau Andalan Pulp & Paper (RAPP) located in Riau in Sumatra. RAPP began operating in 1995 and a pulp production capacity of two million tonnes. At the moment APRIL's paper mill, Riau Andalan Kertas, has a capacity of 350,000 tonnes per year, but APRIL is intending to install another paper machine of the same size which would bring its paper production capacity up to 700,000 tonnes per year.

There are two other significant producers of pulp in Indonesia. Kiani Kertas, a subsidiary of 'Bob' Hasan's Kalimanis Group, has a 525,000 tonne pulp mill which came online in 1998 in East Kalimantan. PT Tanjung Enim Lestari, a joint venture between the Barito Pacific Group (40 per cent) and a consortium of Marubeni, Nippon Paper and Japan's Overseas Economic Co-operation Fund (together 60 per cent), has a 450,000 tonne pulp mill which came online in South Sumatra in 2000. Japan's Marubeni Corporation and Cellmark of Sweden have agreed to purchase the pulp produced for the first 10 years.

2. Unsustainable Supply
The massive growth in pulp production capacity in Indonesia has far outpaced the industry's efforts to secure a sustainable supply of raw materials by developing plantations. As a result, of the 120 million m³ of wood estimated to have been consumed by the pulp industry between 1988 and 2000, only 10 per cent was harvested from plantations. The rest has almost entirely been sourced by clear-cutting natural forest.

This is despite the fact that the Indonesian government has distributed 23 pulpwood plantation licences covering an area of 4.3 million hectares. The CIFOR-WWF report estimates that at its year 2000 capacity level, the Indonesian pulp industry would have only needed a plantation area of 1.1 million hectares to provide its pulp mills with a sustainable supply of timber. This suggests that the allocation of such a large area was motivated by the desire to make large areas of natural forest available to pulp producers regardless of whether the areas would be replanted.

3. Forest Destruction
On the assumption that, on average, producers are able to obtain 110 m³ of pulp or wood from each hectare they clear, the pulp and paper industry in Indonesia seems to be responsible for the destruction of over 900,000 hectares of highly biodiverse rainforest since the late 1980s. Virtually all this area was cleared to supply wood to four large mills. The pulp and paper industry will depend upon clearing rainforests to supply their pulp requirements for at least the next six years and possibly much longer.

A financial officer from one of Indonesia's pulp companies summed up the industry's attitude towards the preference for sourcing unsustainable supplies by saying: "We're in no rush to switch our mill to acacia if there are still cheap supplies of mixed tropical hardwoods available. Why should we be? As it stands, we have access to a very low cost supply of raw materials. Developing good plantations not only involves higher costs, but also a good deal of risk. Right now our HTI's (plantations) are essentially an insurance policy and we will cash it in when the MTH (mixed tropical hardwood's - ie wood cleared from natural forests) is no longer available."

4. Illegal Logging
In addition to the large volume of legal but unsustainably harvested wood that has been felled by the pulp and paper industry, a substantial volume of fibre consumed by Indonesia's pulp and paper industry has come from undocumented sources. Government statistics indicate that the country's pulp mills processed approximately 50 million m³ of wood between 1994 and 1999. Of that figure, only 30 million m³ can be accounted for as originating from licensed forest clearing operations, pulp plantations or imported wood chips. While these figures are not conclusive, they suggest that Indonesian pulp producers may have obtained as much as 20 million m³, or 40 per cent of the wood consumed during this period, from illegal sources.

5. Poor Financial Regulation
The Indonesian government's weak regulation of the country's financial system has enabled pulp and paper companies to gain economic advantage. Each of the major pulp and paper conglomerates was involved in the banking industry before the 1997 financial crisis and some have regularly violated the government's capital adequacy requirements and legal lending limits for capital loans to related parties, including to their associated pulp and paper companies. The use of financial 'mark-up' practices - ie, the artificial inflation of the cost of an investment project - has allowed some pulp and paper producers to secure much larger amounts of financing for their projects than they actually need.

Pulp and paper companies, including APRIL, have also been encouraged to expand to unsustainable levels by Indonesia's generous tax laws, which allow firms to defer paying substantial amounts of corporate income tax in the years following large capital investments. By accelerating fiscal depreciation, Indonesian pulp and paper producers have been able to avoid tax obligations that would otherwise consume up to 30 per cent of their corporate earnings.

6. Debt Driven Expansion
In the case of APRIL, national and international creditors and the Indonesian Bank Reconstruction Agency (IBRA) have tied debt restructuring to the installation of new processing lines at the group's Riau Andalan pulp facility. Between 2000 and 2002 APRIL tripled RAPP's processing capacity at the same time as it was defaulting on its debt payments to IBRA. The reason given for this approach is that APRIL will be able to repay its debts sooner if it is able to expand the volume of pulp that it produces. In entering into this arrangement, IBRA and the group's other creditors have failed to consider the financial risks of the impending shortage of fibre at the RAPP mill which has been exacerbated by the recent expansion of capacity. This approach is highly unsustainable and is indicative of insufficient due diligence by IBRA and the creditors.

7. Financial Risk
The exponential growth of Indonesia's pulp and paper industry has been fuelled by capital investments of between US$12 billion and US$15 billion since the late 1980s. This investment was made without financial institutions first ensuring that the pulp and paper companies had secured a legal and sustainable raw material supply that would adequately meet the volumes of wood demanded by their mills. Financial institutions took on a substantial, if not inordinate, degree of financial risk.


Read more about the report on the CIFOR web site:

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